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OBITER DICTA
An obiter dictum, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an
individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,
bindeth none-not even the lips that utter it."*

CaR

SHOULD PAY!

A certain convict, strangely bored with a sunny southern prison, left without even
a goodbye. The state spent eleven hundred odd dollars to reestablish contact with
its departed guest. Then one of its legal staff concocted the
idea that the rambling rogue ought to reimburse his host
"The first day
for the cost of his recapture. State Highway & Public
-a guest."
Works Commission v. Cobb, 215 N. C. 556, 2 S. E. (2d)
565 (1939). Argued the public prosecutor: the state has the right to expect its
citizens to obey the law (even while they are incarcerated for breaking it), and if
they force the state to spend money reapprehending them, a tort is committed
against the state's property rights. We put aside the question whether this is
southern hospitality, to inquire if it is good law. It was a case of original impression.
Reflect upon the far flung possibilities of the prosecutor's theory in action. If it
is a tort against the state's property rights to commit the crime of escaping jail,
and if the state can recover for expenses incurred, then the same reasoning might
hold for the crime that put the criminal into jail originally. Recovery of funds
expended in the original capture of the criminal would then be possible. And, by the
same token, the state could recover for the costs of prosecution. Moreover it
would be permissible to create a fictitious count for "use and occupation" of the
prison premises-a sort of an implied tenancy for "30 days" or more, dependent
upon the sentence imposed. Herein, also, might be annexed the additional item of
"board." It costs money to keep guards at a prison. Charge them for that, too.
Carry this reasoning a step further. We have an elaborate police system in this
country, the cost of which runs into millions, and its only justification is that
people insist on breaking the law. Very well, let's make them pay for their antisocial attitudes.
This is not all so far fetched as it seems. In related fields, something has been
done on this matter of recovering from the criminal. First of all, there is the fine
that is assessed in many criminal sentences. That enables
"The secondthe arresting governmental unit to augment its income at
the criminal's expense. At common law there was no rea burden."
covery from the criminal for any costs or expenses incident
to his apprehension and prosecution. See United States v. Gaines, 25 L. ed. 733, 734
(1880). Statutes have been enacted in many states permitting recovery of certain
specified costs as part of the sentence. Depending on the statutes passed, various
states now hold that a defendant, convicted of a felony, is liable for all costs of
prosecution. Frazier v. Toliver, 204 Ky. 79, 263 S. W. 713 (1924). And it has
been held that a defendant is liable to pay a jury fee as part of the costs. State v.
Wright, 13 Mlo. 245 (1850).
*BiRRELT, OsrTR DXrcA (1885) title page.
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He has even been saddled with costs of appeal and with a board bill during
incarceration. Paschal v. Sheppard, 6 Ky. Op. 387 (1871). One jurisdiction went
so far as to charge the defendant, although freed of the charges, with the costs of
prosecution, because the circumstances surrounding his arrest were sufficiently suspicious to justify his arrest. Baldwin v. Comm., 26 Pa. St. 171 (1856). Included
in at least one liquor enforcement law is a provision which states that violators
must pay for the sheriff's costs and full costs of prosecution. S. D. ComP. LAWS
(1929) § 10292. Do not the logic and the objectives underlying these statutes sup.
port the prosecutor's contentions in the principal case?
However, the North Carolina court had different ideas. Why, they argued, sue
a man for his "yen for the open spaces and his heeding of the call of the wild"?
No, thank you, the court would have none of it. "No crime
"The thirdagainst the sovereignty of the state violates any of its propa pest"erty rights, and no governmental expenditure paid out for
Laboulaye.
the apprehension of a criminal, or for the maintenance or
recovery of his custody incident to the punishment or
correction of such a crime can be construed into a tortious invasion of the property
rights of the State." So vanished, at least temporarily, the fond hope of the prosecutor that "crime should pay." It was a sparkling hope, though, while it lasted.
Logic is in its favor, and a statutory trend as well. But alas, judicial precedents,
based on the common law, are not.
JAZZ JURISPRUDENCE

"It is clear that though the cacophony of a swing band may fill the soul of a
jitterbug with rapture, it fills the air with barbarous dissonance, in the ears of a
weary worker wooing 'tired Nature's sweet restorer'," said
They Shall Have Hofstadter, J., in Peters v. Moses, 171 Misc. 441, 12 N. Y. S.
Music
(2d) 735 (Sup. Ct. 1939). The occasion was the hearing
of a suit to enjoin the operation of an inn as a nuisance
which was brought by the residents and property owners living near the Claremont
Inn on Riverside Drive in New York City. Seemingly someone had tired of "swing".
But the court must have had some sneaking sympathy for off-beat rhythm because
it enjoined the defendant only from playing music outdoors after midnight; on
Saturday evenings or evenings preceding holidays the time limit was set at 1 A. M.
Although "nuisance" is a word with a plain meaning in everyday terminology,
difficulty is often encountered in determining its exact legal import. Ordinarily a
nuisance is defined as an unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's right to the
peaceful enjoyment of his property, due to the causation by the defendant of smoke,
odors, noises or other deleterious and "intangible" effects. HARPER, TORTS (1933)
§ 179 et seq. Whether music falls within the category of legal nuisance is generally
a question of fact. This is clearly shown in an interesting case announcing that
whether an orchestra is sufficiently annoying to be enjoined as a nuisance, requires
reference to the character, volume, time, place, duration and locality of the detonation against which complaint is made. Peragallo v. Luner, 99 N. J. Eq. 726, 133
AUt. 543 (1926); Cleveland v. Citizen's Gaslight Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 201 (1869).
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Alleged music issuing from a residence used as a vocal studio during daylight
hours was held not to be a nuisance in and of itself in Tonnelli v. Hayes, 118 Misc.
339, 194 N. Y. Supp. 181 (Sup. Ct. 1922). The rule in this
Sing a Song
case intimates that had these young aspirants to operatic
of
fame chosen to exercise their vocal chords at night, the court
Sunbeams
might very well have stepped in and throttled their nocturnal
efforts. Friedman v. Keil, 118 N. J. Eq. 77, 166 ALl 194
(1933). Swing is music (objection overruled!). Well, even though swing is merely
noise, it is clearly a question of fact whether it is enjoinable in equity. But conceding
that the nuisance-value of music is such a question, and hence, bound up with all
of the circumstances of its origin, we do not see why there should be so striking
a difference in the attitude of other New York courts to sleep-disturbing noises.
In Russell v. Nostrand Athletic Club, 212 App. Div. 543, 209 N. Y. Supp. 76 (2d
Dep't 1925), modffied, 240 N. Y. 681, 148 N. E. 756 (1925), although the general
rules pronounced are in harmony with the principal case, their application to the
stated facts and the accompanying language seems to be highly questionable and
very oppressive.
In the latter case, the defendants were operating an open air arena for boxing
exhibitions, once a week from 8 P. M. to 11 P. M. The annoyance alleged was
the noise from automobiles, street hawkers, and shouting fans, which prevented the
neighbors from sleeping. The management was restrained from holding any prize
fight, boxing exhibition, wrestling contest or any other similar activity in the night
time. This decision seems harsh when compared with that of the Claremont Inn.
In the Russell case, the proceedings occurred only once a week and the arena was
peaceful and quiet some time before midnight. In the Claremont Inn case, where
the revelry occurred every night in the week, under the injunction that was granted,
order might not be restored until well on to 1 A. Al. weekdays, and later, on the
eve of a holiday. In both cases, these nuisances occurred in sections strictly residential. Whether sleeplessness be due to a roaring mob or a clash of cymbals is not
important to the neighbors lying wide-eyed on their pillows and it is hard to account
for the differing attitudes in the same city.
Perhaps the Claremont Inn decision is closer to the tendency of most decisions
coming from metropolises. In the final analysis, since the duty devolves upon the
finder of the facts, be it judge or jury, to determine whether
Midnighkt in
an unreasonable annoyance exists, it is obvious that the
Manhattan
judge's impression of the standards of the community concerning what is genteel, as well as what is a reasonable bedtime hour, plays an important part in the solution of the problem. The standards
of most New York communities have not required the quiet of a monastery garden,
nor retirement at dusk, although of course, the quiet life is preferred. But as for
people who wish to retire before 1 A. Al., the words of Professor Lloyd seem apropos.
Exceptionally nervous people, or those whose refinement exceeds the standards of
the ordinary and reasonable man "must seek refuge in sound-proof rooms, if they
can afford them, or take their chances of the padded cell". Lloyd, Noise as a Nuisance
(1934) 82 U. or PA. L. REv. 567, 582. We neutral Americans, though relatively
safe from any European invasion of our shores, had best seek some bomb-proof
shelter as the only protection against the steady, violent barrage of swing which is
being directed against us.

